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INUTILIS SIBI, PERNICIOSUS PATRIAE:
A PLATONIC ARGUMENT AGAINST SOPHISTIC RHETORIC-""^
HELEN F. NORTH
Critics of style in antiquity liked to say that if Zeus spoke
2 )
Greek, he would talk like Plato. ' They might have added
that if Plato had spoken Latin when he talked about rhetoric,
he would have said Odi et amo - I hate and I love. Both sides
of this hate-love relationship had far-reaching consequences.
One of them is the immensely long and influential after-life
of Plato's charges against sophistic rhetoric. The repeti-
tion and amplification of his arguments constitute a dominant
feature of the warfare between philosophy and rhetoric that
erupted intermittently from the early fourth century B.C. to
the end of antiquity, and indeed to modern times. Plato's
invective, as is well known, is based on grounds both moral
and technical. Much attention has been paid to the ramifi-
cations of the arguments tending to prove that rhetoric is
not an art {teohne) , by far the most telling charge, sxnce
if there was no art there could be no systematic instruction,
hence no lucrative profession for the sophists. Among his
other charges the most enduring, because it expressed a
fundamental reaction widespread among the Greeks long before
Plato and long after him, was the assertion that rhetoric was
either useless or positively dangerous both to the state and
to the rhetor himself. I should like to examine this argu-
ment as it was employed at several different periods, partly
in order to trace its development, partly to discover how far
it reflected a reality in Greek and Roman life.
ANTI-RHETORICAL ARGUMENTS BEFORE PLATO
Our story begins in the last third of the fifth century.
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when hostility to the sophists and their teaching formed a
familiar theme in Greek literature. Fear of the subversive
power of eloquence - "Wretched Persuasion, irresistible child
of Ate" Aeschylus calls her in the Agamemnon (385-386) - was of
course nothing new; many instances of such concern could be
cited from archaic and classical times. But it was the
sophists ' systematic approach to the teaching of eloquence
and, even more, the disconcerting consequences in Athenian
political life that brought apprehension to a new level of
intensity. As a result, writers of the late fifth century
often record a view of rhetoric foreshadowing in broad out-
line Plato's polemic.
That rhetoric is harmful to society is a frequent theme in
Old Comedy, which normally identifies the rhetor with the
demagogue. At times it forms part of the more general com-
plaint of the older generation against the younger, the
traditionalists against the innovators. In the Aahamians
,
for example, the old men of the Chorus describe with bitter
resentment the way they are humiliated by the upstart young
orators. A young man, acting as prosecutor, belabors an old
man with rounded phrases, sets word-traps for him, and "tear-
ing, troubling, confusing old Tithonus," deprives him of the
money he has saved to buy himself a coffin, money that must
now be spent to pay a fine (690-692) .
Here it is a specific segment of the polls that feels
threatened by the consequences of sophistic teaching. Else-
where Aristophanes implies that the entire city is endangered,
either because the young men are being corrupted through a
kind of education that rejects the traditional values, or be-
cause the sophistic orators deceive the juries and the assem-
bly by their ability to make the worse argument appear better
(the Old Comedy version of the sophistic claim to make the
weaker stronger) , ' or (more generally) by their superior
cleverness {deinotes) . The Clouds and the Frogs provide examples
of all these charges, as when the Dikaios Logos in the Clouds
pronounces the city mad for breeding the Adikos Logos to inflict
outrage on the youngsters (925-926) and tells Pheidippides
that if he studies with the sophists he will be taught to
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consider everything base fair and fair base and will also be
filled with unnatural lust (1020-1021) . That sophistic rhet-
oric or demagoguery and homosexuality go together is a common
8
)
imputation. In the Knights the strongest proof that the
Sausage-seller can outdo Cleon as a demagogue is his homo-
sexual record (1242-1262) . In the Frogs Euripides is blamed
for instilling in the young men both forms of vice: he
teaches them to chatter and babble, thus emptying the palaes-
tras and turning the babblers into sexual perverts (1069-
1071) .
Characters in Euripidean tragedy frequently express fears
aroused by a combination of unscrupulous ambition and clever-
ness in speaking (often described as deinotes or being deinos
legein), and the concern is adapted to a surprising variety
9 )
of mythical situations. One comment must stand for all:
Medea's description of the man who combines injustice with
cleverness of speech (being sophos legein), and, boasting that
he will cover up his unjust deed with his tongue, stops at
nothing [Medea 580-583). Often there is also a reference to
the clever speaker's ability to charm an audience. In the
Hippolytus Phaedra says that cities and households are de-
stroyed by excessively fair speeches [kaloi lian logoi) , and
she deplores the consequences of saying what pleases the ear
(486-489). Her phrase, terpna legein (to say what is pleasant)
corresponds to the word charizesthai (to charm, gratify) , com-
mon in denunciations of sophistic rhetoric by Plato and his
followers, and usually associated with the concept of rhetoric
as a form of flattery {kolakeia) . Already in Old Comedy this
charge was lodged even against the most distinguished of the
sophists, as in t.he Kolakes of. Eupolis, which portrayed Prota-
goras as toadying to the rich man, Callias.
Still another kind of threat to the state emanating from
rhetoric is mentioned by Thucydides. A famous passage in the
Mytilene debate represents Cleon as complaining that Athenian
fondness for speeches constitutes a danger, together with ill-
timed pity and compassion (3.40.2-3). In this instance the
danger is that through their enjoyment of debate, as if the
assembly were a theatre, the Athenians will become too
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unstable to maintain a consistent policy. ^2) ^he comic poets
in like manner made fun of the changeableness of the Athenian
demos, a topic easily combined with attacks on unscrupulous
13)
rhetors who manipulate the mob for their own advantage.
Old Comedy also hints now and then that the practice of
oratory is inconvenient or even dangerous to the orator him-
self. The fatigue and harassment suffered by the lawyer (the
subject of a vivid passage in the Theaetetus of Plato) are
already mentioned in the Clouds, when the Just Argument con-
trasts the enviable condition of the young athlete with the
sorry state of the pupil of the sophists: babbling in the
agora coarse jests and dragged along for the sake of a hair-
splitting-pettifogging-barefaced-knavish-boring affair (1003-
1004) . Actual danger to the rhetor when he has won power for
a time and then is ousted is a theme in the Knights, where it
is suggested that the people he has deluded are in fact aware
of his knavery and are just waiting for the right moment to
turn on him. The Chorus reproaches old Demos for being gul-
lible and easily misled by fawning speakers, but he replies
that he voluntarily plays the fool and deliberately fattens
thieving politicians until the time comes to destroy them
14)(1115-1130) . The danger that threatens the demagogue - a
fall from power when the fickle citizens desert him - was one
that fifth-century politics had made familiar to the Atheni-
ans. Ostracism or exile had befallen Hipparchus, Aristides,
Cimon, Themistocles, Ephialtes, Thucydides son of Melesias,
and Hyperbolus (first ostracized, later murdered) , while
15)
Miltiades, the hero of Marathon, had died m chains.
Actual execution was far less common, but by the time of
Demosthenes, who died by his own hand, and Hypereides, who
was in fact executed, the danger of death as a consequence of
oratorical eminence - a necessary condition of political
power - became a reality.
A different kind of disadvantage to the speaker, inherent
in his very mastery of rhetoric, was the likelihood that pol-
ished oratory would so prejudice the listener that he would
react against the orator, and thus, the more eloquent the
speaker was, the more likely he would be to lose his case.
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In the rhetorical treatises of the fourth century warnings
about this danger begin to appear, as when Aristotle advises
the concealment of artifice, comparing it to mixing drinks
{Rhet. 1404bl8-21) , but already in the fifth century the dis-
claimer of deinotes is so common in the Proem of actual and
fictitious speeches as to prove that speakers were systemat-
ically attempting to compensate for the possible disadvantage
of appearing too eloquent.
THE PLATONIC OPPOSITION
All the anti-rhetorical charges take on a new coherence
when Plato works them into a pattern of accusations that
intertwine the immorality and the inartistic nature of so-
phistic rhetoric. According to Plato, an art must be useful
17) ' ••{Gorg. 501B) . Discussion of the fundamental issue, "Is
rhetoric useful?" (chreiodes, utilis) enabled its enemies to
conclude that it was not just devoid of usefulness but
positively dangerous {epiblabes, permiaiosa). The kind of decep-
tion ascribed to the rhetors by the comic poets, which from
the first included deception in the realm of values, making
the base seem fair and vice versa, chimed perfectly with
Plato's view of what was essentially harmful to the indi-
vidual and society, an issue that was for him always a matter
of values.
The Apology foreshadows the Gorgias. Socrates' claim that he
alone benefits the citizens, because he urges them to care
for phronesis, aletheia , and the psyche, rather than chremata, doxa ,
and time (29D-E, 36C) , and that his life of questioning and
refuting, in obedience to the command of Apollo, is the
greatest good that ever came to Athens {3 0A) implies that
the actual statesmen instill false values and do harm, rather
than good, to the citizens.
The charge is made explicit in the Gorgias, where Socrates
maintains that four of the greatest statesmen of the fifth
century, Cimon, Miltiades, Themistocles , and Pericles, far
from benefiting the citizens in any real sense, left them
worse than they found them (502D ff, 515C ff ) . Pericles,
Plato's major target, made the Athenians lazy, cowardly.
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talkative, and greedy (515E). One proof is that the states-
men themselves were ultimately rejected - ostracized, exiled,
fined, even sentenced to death.
In this dialogue the nature of power is the crucial issue.
The most profound attraction of rhetoric in every period of
political liberty has been its promise of power; that is what
arete politike really meant. The rhetors represented by Gorgias
'
pupil Polus have as their goal power and as their ideal the
tyrant, whose power seems unlimited. But according to Socra-
tes what the successful rhetor or tyrant achieves is not
power at all, because he does not know what is truly in his
best interest. When, in the myth of the Last Judgment, the
consequences of political success are revealed suh speoie
aetemitatis, the incurable sinners - those doomed to eternal
punishment - prove to be those who enjoyed the greatest power
in life, tyrants, kings, and the like (525D) . Moreover, even
in their days of glory the rhetors are the reverse of power-
ful. They are in fact slaves, because they depend for suc-
cess on the favor of those they purport to govern. They are
mere flatterers {ko lakes ) , at the mercy of the demos, exactly
like the demagogue in the Knights of Aristophanes.
The unhappy consequences for the rhetor of the practice of
rhetoric become part of Plato's contrast between the two ways
of life, the active and the contemplative. Hence the Gorgias
presents much evidence of the ultimate uselessness or even
danger of being a rhetor (here equivalent to politikos , states-
man) ; the greater the success, the greater the danger. An
equally sharp contrast between philosopher and rhetor, this
time the dicanic orator, occurs in the Theaetetus , where the
basis of the contrast is the presence or absence of leisure
(sahole). The courtroom lawyer is depicted in terms that
amplify the brief description in the Clouds, referred to above.
Socrates says that those who have been rolling around [kalindou-
menoi) in the courts since their youth seem, when compared to
philosophers, like slaves compared to free men. In contrast
to the philosophers, with their infinite leisure, the lawyers
are always in a hurry, driven by the water-clock, forbidden
to deviate from the affidavit, arguing always about a fellow-
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slave, whose life is often at stake. 1^) As a result, Socra-
tes says, they become nervous, high-strung, knowing how to
fawn upon their master with words and flatter him (aharisasthai)
with deeds, but small and not upright in their souls. The
slavery they have suffered from youth deprives them of growth,
straightforwardness, and freedom, compelling them to do
crooked things by imposing on them great risks and fears,
while their souls are tender. Unable to bear these burdens
with justice and truth, they turn to deceit and reciprocal
wrong-doing. Thus they become bent and cramped, so that they
go from youth to manhood with nothing healthy in their minds,
while yet supposing themselves to have become clever and wise
(172D-173B)
.
As Plato shaped it, what we may, for the sake of brevity,
christen the periculum-topos consisted of two principal charges:
(1) sophistic rhetoric endangers society because it fosters
false values and enables them to prevail, and (2) it endan-
gers the orator himself because it instills these values in
his soul. It also requires him to spend his time in ignoble,
tedious activities, and it exposes him to the danger of exile
and death, but for Plato the most serious danger is to the
soul of the rhetor, not to his life, property, or political
survival. In Roman times, as we shall see, the emphasis
changed.
Already in Plato's lifetime his arguments against sophistic
rhetoric as immoral and inartistic were being repeated with
embellishments. An early example is the lost Gryllus of Aris-
totle, a dialogue somehow related to the profusion of encomia
in honor of Xenophon's son, who was killed in battle in 362.
The Gryllus, which attacked the claim of rhetoric to be a
techne , was evidently not itself an encomium, since it criti-
cized the myriad writers of these eulogies for fawning on
Xenophon (again the viord ohopizomenoi). Diogenes Laertius, to
whom we owe this information, adds that one such eulogy was
composed by Isocrates (11.55). It is well known that when
Aristotle began to teach rhetoric in the Academy, probably
around 360, he proclaimed his intent with a parody of a line
spoken by Odysseus in the Philoatetes of Euripides: It is
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disgraceful to be silent and let the barbarians speak. For
the word "barbarians" Aristotle substituted the name Isocra-
tes, thus, according to Philodemus, exposing himself to
dreadful retribution and ill-will, whether from the students
19)
of Isocrates or some other sophists. Cephisodorus, one
of Isocrates' pupils, wrote four books Against Aristotle, and
Isocrates himself in the Antidosis (composed around 352) re-
sponded to various attacks, not only on rhetoric, but also
on himself, from whatever source. One passage, which insists
on the benefits conferred on the state by those leaders who
were most practiced in rhetoric (231) , sounds like a reply to
Plato's attack on the four statesmen in the Gorgias and has
even been thought to have inspired the Defence of the Four by
20)
the sophist Aelius Aristides five hundred years later.
In the mid-fourth century B.C. the rivalry between philoso-
phy and rhetoric was beyond question a live issue. The very
success of Isocrates' school was what inspired the Academy to
take up the teaching of rhetoric in the first place, and
Aristotle's afternoon lectures on the subject were revolution-
ary in their consequences. Some famous orators (Lycurgus,
Hypereides) were said to have studied with both Plato and
Isocrates, but others adhered to one school or the other, and
rivalry must have been keen, although we have no reason to
believe that the relation of the leaders themselves - Plato
and Isocrates - was acrimonious.
Despite the tremendous success of Isocrates' school in his
lifetime, the struggle for supremacy was won by the philoso-
phers. In the next two centuries all major advances, even
in rhetoric, were made by the philosophical schools, the
Peripatetic in particular, although the Academy and the Stoa
21
)
also had some impact. ^ Thus for a time the arguments
against rhetoric were superfluous, and we hear few echoes of
the Platonic invective. But in the second century B.C. the
rivalry again became acute, with the appearance of a bold
challenge to the primacy of the philosophers. Hermagoras of
Temnos (ca. 150 B.C.) now emerged as the first spokesman for
rhetoric since Isocrates himself who could offer a sufficient-
ly comprehensive system to attract wide notice, and among his
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innovations was practice in debating theses, general questions
not limited to specific individuals or circumstances, but
broadly philosophical in nature. This aspect of Hermagoras'
teaching attracted mature students, rather than mere school-
boys. Some philosophers evidently became alarmed, partly
because the debate on abstract questions had hitherto been
their province, partly because some of the students attracted
were Romans. By the mid-second century there had become
apparent in the Roman world a tremendous hunger for Greek
higher education, as voracious as the contemporary taste for
Greek sculpture, and the desire to dominate this great new
market inspired a renewal of the warfare between philosophy
and rhetoric. It was as if the philosophical schools with
one voice had echoed Aristotle and proclaimed, "It is dis-
graceful to be silent and let the barbarians learn to speak
from the rhetoricians."
No doubt this was the time at which philosophers fostered
'the myth that Demosthenes was the student of Plato, as
Pericles of Anaxagoras, a myth conveying the strong implica-
tion that even the professional orator might better seek
. . 22)instruction from the Academy than from the rhetoricians.
But for most of their ammunition the philosophers turned to
Plato himself, and the charges first elaborated in the Gorgias
,
Phaedrus , and Theaetetus were dusted off and put to work again
with embellishments suitable to the various schools and the
particular circumstances of the second-century Graeco-Roman
world. By far the most telling charge was still that rheto-
ric was not a techne, and many new reasons were found for
23)denying it this status, but the lack of utility or the
positive harmfulness of rhetoric to the state and to the
practitioner evidently continued to be regarded as an effec-
tive argument. It is time to consider the reasons for the
revival of the periculum-topos , some new forms that it took, and
the sources (whether schools or individual philosophers)
probably responsible for them.
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THE PERICULUM-TOPOS IN THE GRAECO-ROMAN WORLD
The argument was attractive to philosophers because of
the nature of the appeal that rhetoric made to the Romans.
They too were interested in its practical utility, its power
to enhance their effectiveness in political and forensic
affairs. Despite the vast differences between fifth-century
Athens and second-century Rome, the lure of what the sophists
called arete politike was equally potent for ambitious men in
both cities. Those who had leisure and means would pay high
prices for an art of persuasion that would give them leader-
ship in the state and with it the power to advance the
24)interests of themselves and their friends. If they could
be convinced that what the rhetoricians had to offer was in-
effective, while the philosophers were better able to help
them realize their ambitions, they might turn away from such
popular teachers of rhetoric, consulted in Rome, Athens, or
Rhodes, as Menedemus and the two Apollonii, and instead
patronize Academics like Charmadas or Peripatetics like
Diodorus, whom Crassus and Antonius are described (in de
Oratore) as having heard (late in the second century) deride
25)
and belittle rhetoric and rhetoricians. Although the
polemic reported in de Oratore revolved around the charge that
rhetoric is not an art and there is no reference to the peri-
culum-topos, this line of argument must also have been current,
if we may judge by the counter-arguments marshalled by Cicero
and Quintilian. Some, at least, of the enemies of rheto-
ric must have considered it worthwhile to try to convince
the Romans that both they and their country were endangered
by the unrestrained practice of oratory, and that philosophy
could teach them to nullify the danger by dosing eloquentia
with sapientia. Whether this type of argument ever had any
practical effect on hard-headed Romans, or whether it was
simply a debating point that enabled rival schools to score
off one another is difficult to judge, but there is no doubt
that the Platonic invective about the harm done to the state
and the statesman by sophistic rhetoric was developed with a
wealth of new detail in the polemic reflected by our sources
in Roman times.
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To be sure, opposition to rhetoric at Rome did not spring
exclusively or even primarily from the philosophers, any more
than it had in Greece. Roman conservatism was enough to
account for the outraged reaction to the visit of the three
Greek ambassadors in 155 B.C., when Carneades in particular
shocked the Senate by speaking on successive days for and
against the value of justice in the state. All three leg-
ates were philosophers, but as George Kennedy observes of
Carneades, the Romans probably considered them at least as
much rhetoricians as philosophers. All three were esteemed
as speakers, and their visit remained a landmark in the
27)
history of the reception of Greek rhetoric at Rome.
The conflict between the generations also affected the
Roman attitude towards rhetoric, to judge by a passage from
28
)
a play by Naevius, which suggests that the Roman stage,
like the Attic, early became familiar with references to the
danger of oratory, especially as practiced by the young.
The question is asked: Cedo qui vestram rem piibliaam tantam amisistis
tarn citol (Pray tell, how did you so quickly destroy so great
a commonwealth?) . Cicero, who quotes the line in de Seneotute
(6.60), says that there were various replies, but hoc in primis:
Proveniebant oratores novi, stulti, adulescentuli (There sprang up
new orators, stupid, mere striplings) . The quotation is ap-
propriate to Cicero's defence of old age; what he emphasizes
is not so much the danger of oratory as the danger inherent
in young orators. But in his rhetorical works he often re-
fers to the widespread belief that Rome had suffered great
harm from ambitious, unprincipled speakers, their age not
specified. His earliest treatise, de Inventione, opens with a
defence of rhetoric against just this charge. The defence
consists of a condemnation of both eloquentia sine sapientia and
sapientia sine eloquentia. The orator who neglects the study of
moral philosophy is inutilis sibi, pemiaiosus patriae, whereas one
who arms himself with eloquence in order to defend the state
is et suis et publiais rationibus utilissimus atque ojnioissimus (1.1.1)-
most helpful and friendly to his own and to the public inter-
est. From eloquence many advantages accrue to the state,
provided only that sapientia, the moderatrix omnium rerum, be at
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hand (1.4. 5). 29)
Cicero is one of our principal sources for the revival
and expansion in Rome of the Platonic invective against so-
phistic rhetoric. The others are his contemporary, the
Epicurean Philodemus, in the fragments of his de Rhetoriaa,
Quintilian's Institutio Ovatovia, written towards the end of
the first century after Christ, Tacitus in the Dialogue de
Oratoribus a few years later, and Sextus Empiricus, the Acad-
emic philosopher of the second century in his treatise
Against the Rhetoriaians
.
A succinct example of how the argument accusing rhetoric
of being dangerous to the state had developed by the end of
the first century of the Empire is supplied by Quintilian,
who devotes Book II, chapter 16 of the Institutio to the ques-
tion An utitis rhetorice. (Chapter 17 asks whether it is an art.)
Quoting the foes of rhetoric, he says, "it is eloquence (they
claim) that saves the guilty from punishment, that sometimes, by its
trickery, causes the innocent to be condemned, that leads deliberation
in the wrong direction, that arouses not only seditions and popular
uprisings, but even wars that cannot be expiated, that, finally, achieves
its maximum power when it enables error to prevail over truth. The comic
poets charge even Socrates with teaching how to make the worse case seem
better, and Plato maintains against Tisias and Gorgias that they made
like promises. To them are added examples among the Greeks and Romans,
and they list those who by employing their pernicious eloquence not only
against individuals but even against states threw into confusion and
overturned organized society. For this reason rhetoric was expelled
from Sparta, and at Athens also, where the speaker was forbidden to ap-
peal to the emotions, the power of oratory was, so to speak, pruned back
(2.16.1-5) ."
The antecedents of most of these charges can be found in
Old Comedy, Plato, and Aristotle, and if more survived of
Hellenistic literature we might detect still closer analogies,
but in the present state of our sources one item stands out
as a genuine novelty: the allegation that Sparta expelled the
rhetors, a charge to which we may turn our attention before
considering the Roman development of the perisulum-topos as a
whole.
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THE EXPULSION-rOP05
The expulsion of the rhetors has the air of being a his-
torical fact, like the Athenian law against emotional appeals.
But in the latter case we know that Quintilian has extended to
the whole of Attic oratory a rule that Aristotle says applied
to pleading before the Areopagus [Rhet. 1354a) , and we should
perhaps be equally skeptical about the expulsion of the
orators, although Quintilian is not alone in mentioning this
alleged event. Of our other major sources Sextus Empiricus
says that both Sparta and Crete expelled the orators or ref-
used them entry, while Philodemus surprisingly pairs Sparta
and Rome as states that get along without rhetoric and else-
where maintains that Athens expelled and executed the rhe-
30)tors (perhaps a conflation of the expulsion- topos with the
argument from the Gorgias that the Four Statesmen corrupted
the Athenians, the proof being their fall from power, which
in two cases involved exile of some kind)
.
What looks like a milder form of the expulsion-topos is the
assertion that there is no tradition of oratory in certain
cities; Sparta, Argos, Corinth, and Thebes are mentioned by
Cicero, who makes an exception for Epaminondas in the case of
Thebes. This version of the topos , which is also used by
Tacitus, is normally put in the form of a question, "Who ever
heard of an orator from...?" When such a question is
asked, there is usually also a reference to Athens, sometimes
Rhodes, as the place where oratory flourished, Cicero's al-
lusion to the absence of oratory in Sparta and the other
cities serves to emphasize by contrast the achievement of
Athens and Rhodes; there is no reference to the periaulum-topos
.
But Tacitus uses the lack of orators in Sparta and Crete (to
which he adds Macedon and Persia) as proof that well-ordered
states do not tolerate rhetoric.
The expulsion -topos proper (characterized in Greek by the
verb ekballein) seems originally to have referred only to Sparta
and Crete. Sextus ascribes the argument to Critolaus the
Peripatetic, but says that it was also used by Cleitomachus
and Charmadas of the Academy (both pupils of Carneades, who is
32)therefore sometimes suggested as its author) . In both
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Sextus and Philodemus the expulsion- topos constitutes one of
the proofs that rhetoric is not an art. In Sextus it takes
the form of a syllogism: cities do not expel arts that are
useful (biopheleis) . But Crete and Sparta barred the orators.
33
)
Therefore rhetoric is not an art. The criterion of use-
fulness shows how the topos could be attracted to the issue
with which Quintilian connects it {An utilis rhetoriae) , which in
34)
turn develops into the perioulion-topos
.
To go behind Critolaus and Carneades and find an earlier
source for the expulsion- topos has so far proved unrewarding.
Both fit the period (mid-second century) when embellishments
of the Platonic arguments were being sought, and both were at
once competent speakers themselves and enemies of the profes-
sional rhetors. Yet it is not difficult to suggest some of
the passages that might have inspired them. The general
theme of rhetoric as a danger to the state goes back, as we
have seen, to Plato and beyond. But Plato does not, in the
Gorgias or elsewhere, make the point that any state has ex-
pelled the rhetors as a class. He does, in Republic 39 8A-B
,
require that poets be expelled from the ideal state if they
do not meet its rigorous moral standards, and there is a
similar passage in the Lcaos 817A. But Plato's language in
the Republic is comparatively mild: apopempein (send away), not
ekballein. The terminology of the second-century expulsion-
topos is, however, anticipated in the Gorgias, in the passage
comparing rhetoricians to athletic trainers. Gorgias says
that it is not right to attack, hate, and expel (ekballein)
from the cities the trainers and teachers of those who misuse
athletic skills. No more is it right, if someone becomes
rhetorikos and through this capacity and art does wrong, to
hate and expel from the cities the one who taught him.
What has happened in the mid-second century is that Carneades,
Critolaus, and their followers have asserted as an actual,
historical event, occurring in specified states, what Gorgias
offered as a hypothetical example of what should not be done
anywhere.
Plato also, beyond doubt, inspired the choice of Sparta
and Crete as the states that expelled the rhetors, although
256 Illinois Classical Studies, VI.
2
he himself never makes this claim. His frequent allusions to
them as exemplars of stable government canonized them for the
later tradition. The very fact that the two men who, in
the Laws, accompany the Athenian stranger on his long walk
across the island, discussing the foundation of the new city,
are from Sparta and Crete demonstrates Plato's regard for
these states as the two most faithful repositories of the
conservative Dorian ethos.
Undoubtedly also the Spartan reputation for taciturnity -
the very concept of what it meant to be laconic - made it
37)inevitable that Sparta figure in the expulsion-topos. There
is a passage in the Protagoras that may well have affected this
development. Socrates, with transparent irony, says that the
Spartans and the Cretans have cultivated philosophy more
seriously and longer than anyone else. Spartan sophia does
not, however, show itself in fluent discourse, but in pithy
sayings, like those of the Seven Wise Men, of whom Chilon of
Sparta was one. Socrates refers to braahylogia tis Lakonike
(343B) , and Sextus Empiricus tells two anecdotes about the
Spartan preference for brevity, one a story that contrasts a
Laconic envoy with long-winded Athenian ambassadors, the
other a dramatic account of how the Spartans refused an ap-
peal couched in a long speech, but yielded when it was pre-
sented with appropriate terseness (22-23)
.
In Sextus it was a Cretan lawgiver, evidently Thaletas,
who first forbade those who prided themselves on their ora-
tory to land on the island. Then Lycurgus of Sparta, an
3 8)
admirer of Thaletas, ' enacted the same legislation for his
own country. Long afterward a young man who had studied
rhetoric abroad was punished by the Ephors upon his return
home, because he practiced deceptive speeches in order to
mislead Sparta (21) . Plutarch, who says that Lycurgus denied
entrance to merchants, sophists, seers, and vagabonds, re-
cords the expulsion by the Ephors of a certain Cephisophon
39)for offering to speak all day on any subject.
Philodemus does not mention Sparta or Crete in the frag-
ments of Book V, whose subject is the utility of rhetoric,
although he does observe that cities left by the rhetoricians
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would be better off than those to which they went, while in
his treatment of the topos of rhetoric as a danger to the
rhetorician he mentions that many orators have been banished
40)
or executed. But in other books, especially those dealing
with the issue of rhetoric as a techne, Philodemus alludes to
some form of the expulsion-topos at least four times, saying,
for example, that some states, such as Sparta, have expelled
the rhetors, along with the perfumers and dyers, although
they welcome genuine teohnai, and that the Romans and the
41)Spartans manage their states without rhetoric.
Tacitus elaborates the expulsion- topos with an adroit adap-
tation to the circumstances in which he writes. The last
speech of Maternus in the Dialogus associates great oratory
with tumult in the state and as part of the proof that eloquen-
tia is the alumna Haentiae (which fools call liberty) asks what
orator has ever been heard of from Sparta or Crete. No more
did Macedon, Persia, or any other state aerto imperio oontenta
produce a tradition of eloquence. By contrast, orators
flourished in Rhodes and Athens, both of them states in which
omnia omnes potevant - all power belonged to everyone - and it
was in the time of civil strife that eloquence bloomed in
42)
Rome (40.3-4). As has often been observed, Tacitus here
contradicts Cicero's statement that eloquence is the companion
of peace, the ally of leisure, and the nursling of a settled
society {Brutus 45) , emphasizing his disagreement by echoing
Cicero's vocabulary. From Cicero Tacitus may also have taken
his reference to Athens and Rhodes, for in the Brutus 52 Cice-
ro links the Rhodian and Attic orators stylistically, but the
Macedonians and Persians probably owe their presence in Taci-
tus ultimately to Gorgias 470D-471D, where Polus considers
Archelaus, King of Macedon, and the Great King exemplars of
happiness, while Socrates withholds agreement because he does
not know the condition of their paideia and dikaiosyne.
Leaving the expulsion- topos and returning to the broader
subject of periculum, we find that Sextus Empiricus is our most
detailed and reliable informant about the reasons developed
after Plato to support his charge that rhetoric threatens the
state. (Much evidence is also embedded in the fragments of
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Philodemus' de Hhetoriaa, but the condition of the text often
makes it difficult to interpret.) Sextus says that among
barbarians, who have little or no rhetoric, laws are stable,
whereas in Athens they change from day to day. This type of
accusation goes back ultimately to Cleon's speech in the Myti-
lene debate, charging the Athenians with instability and
expressing his own preference for amathia meta sophrosynes (igno-
rance combined with discipline) over dexiotes meta akolasias
43)(cleverness accompanied by lack of restraint) . In the
course of time the amathia recommended by Cleon has been car-
ried to the extreme of barbarism. A line from Plato Comicus
about the impossibility of recognizing Athens if one has been
away for three months, because the laws have changed in one's
44)
absence, has now been attached to our topos (35) .
Sextus further maintains that the rhetoricians' practice
of teaching their students how to argue according to either
the wording of the law or the intent, depending on which ap-
proach is more advantageous, shows that their aim is actually
subversion of the laws (36-37) . Platonic inspiration is
particularly evident in two other charges: orators are like
jugglers (i|jri(poixaLHTaL ) , blinding the judges as if by sleight
of hand (39), and the demagogue is like a dealer in drugs,
because he teaches evil to most people by saying what gives
45)
them pleasure (the oharizesthai-arq-ament again, 42) . Doubt-
less recalling Plato's famous equation in Gorgias 465D7,
Sextus uses a different, but related comparison: the dema-
gogue is to the statesman as the drug-dealer is to the phy-
sician (41) . These arguments are all ascribed to the
Academics (43, cf. 20).
Sextus also explores the other branch of the topos, that
rhetoric either is not useful to the orator himself, or is
actively harmful to him. His demonstration that it is epi-
blabes (harmful) recalls the passage in the Theaetetus about the
dikanikos rhetor, since most of the disadvantages result from
the practice of forensic oratory, although the first of these,
waste of time [kalindeisthai en agorais , rolling around in the as-
semblies, 27), applies to deliberative oratory as well. Other
unpleasant consequences of the oratorical profession are
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consorting with evil characters, engaging in vicious prac-
tices, making enemies, being a cheat and a wizard, and endur-
ing weariness and exhaustion while listening constantly to
the tears and lamentations of those in trouble. In this
recital we recognize as echoes of Plato the lack of leisure,
the corruption of the orator's own character, and various
key words, such as goes (wizard, 28) and the verb kalindeisthai
,
a variant of kulindoumenoi in the Theaetetus 17 2C . A very sim-
ilar list of nuisances comprises the reasons offered by
Maternus in Tacitus' Dialogus for giving up oratory in favor
46)
of writing poetry.
Philodemus in Book V is more interested in the danger of
rhetoric to its practitioner than in the peril it offers to
the state, although at the close of Book IV he notices that
47)
rhetoric is based on deceit and does harm. He too compares
rhetors to magicians, able to bring down the moon, but to no
good purpose. Throughout much of Book V he contrasts the
rhetor with the philosopher, always, of course, to the phi-
losopher's advantage. The rhetor, for example, incurs the
enmity of powerful rulers, whereas the philosopher gains the
friendship of public men by helping them out of their trou-
K1 49)bles.
From Philodemus we also learn that the traditional dis-
claimer of deinotes has developed into an elaborate argument
about the uselessness of rhetoric: more men are acquitted
because they lack rhetoric than because they know it. Stam-
mering is more persuasive than eloquence, because jurors are
so fearful of being deceived. By no type of speech is the
juror persuaded so effectively as by the brave, just, and
temperate actions of the uneducated - a remarkable testimony
50
)
to the power of persuasion through ethos. A further
amplification of this general topos holds that the rewards of
eloquence do not compensate for its costs, since in order to
seem epieikes (modest, reasonable, the ideal quality sought in
ethical persuasion) , the orator must pretend to be inexpert
or risk antagonizing the jury. But if he does so, he for-
feits some of the power that rhetoric confers and at the same
^ 51)
time loses his integrity, the real cause of success.
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Philodemus further records the argument that many rhetors
have been banished or executed, yet only two or three (he
names Themistocles , Alcibiades, and Callistratus) have spoken
52)brilliantly. Rhetors who try to restrain the people from
53)
satisfying their desires are fined and killed. Moreover,
the mob tends to envy (phthonei) those it has honored when it
54)thinks they do not give enough in return. That rhetors
succeed only so long as they please the people obviously
derives from the topos of kolakeia in the Gorgias, which in turn
has roots in Old Comedy, but it may be that the topic of
phthonos had a special appeal to Epicureans. We find it also
in Lucretius, who describes invidia as the thunderbolt that
hurls e swmo. .
. in Tartara taetra those who have struggled to
55)
reach the heights of office.
Philodemus often presents arguments that, while Epicurean
in spirit and language, have a distinctly Platonic ring. He
says, for example, that it is better to learn from philosophy
to care for oneself, than from rhetoric to care for the multi-
tude. This view corresponds to Epicurus' rejection of both
rhetoric and politics in favor of cultivating tranquillity,
but the line of thought recalls Alcibiades' confession of
failure in the Symposium and the argument of the First Alcibia-
des. Furthermore, the Epicureans, perhaps more than any of
the other post-Platonic schools, took to heart Plato's con-
trast between the leisure enjoyed by the philosopher and the
futile activity of the rhetor. They may not have valued
sohole more than did the other schools, but their special
telos - ataraxia, tranquillitas - gave them the strongest possible
reason for avoiding rhetoric, which could not do other than
destroy the possibility of achieving the summim bonum. Diogenes
of Oenoanda describes the rhetorical profession as full of
excitement and confusion {tarache) over the ability to persuade.
Yet control lies with others, not the orator; hence it is
57)pointless to pursue such an activity. The peculiarity of
the sect to which Philodemus belonged was that it approved of
one branch of rhetoric, the epideictic, but only because it
had nothing to do with the perils and excitements of political
and forensic oratory. Even this genus aausarum had been rejected
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by Epicurus, according to the Vita, which says that the wise
5 8 )
man will not engage in panegyric.
RELATION OF THE PERICULUM-TOPOS TO REALITY IN ROME
Quintilian in the passage from Institutio 11,16 already
quoted refers to the formation of lists of Greeks and Romans
who by their eloquence overthrew organized society. The Ro-
man list included such stock examples as the Gracchi and the
two seditiosi, L. Appuleius Saturninus and C. Servilius Glaucia,
59 )both members of the popular party. This list evidently
originates, not with the philosophers, but with the political
conservatives whose views Cicero normally reflects. In the
introduction to de Inventione he for once admits the Gracchi to
the company of those in whom virtus, auatoritas, and eloquentia
are combined (1.4.5), but in his later works he denounces
them as prime examples of unprincipled though eloquent men
who endanger the republic. Thus Scaevola in de Orators, when
he comments that more harm than good has come to Rome per
homines eloquentissimos , contrasts the father of the Gracchi, by
no means eloquent, yet often a source of salvation to the
state, with his two sons, both diserti (a word denoting less
approval on Cicero's part than eloquens) , who, however, rem
publicam dissipaoerunt (wasted the property of the commonwealth,
1.38-40). In the Brutus Cicero admits that each of the sons
was summus orator, but says that they both failed to match, in
mens ad rem publicam, their ingenium ad bene dioendim (103 ) . After
the Gracchi the most eloquent of the seditiosi was Saturninus,
while the most wicked man in human history was Glaucia, whom
Cicero compares to Hyperbolus, branded for his improbitas by
the writers of Old Comedy (224) . That these four were part
of a standard list employed by the enemies of rhetoric is
clear from their reappearance in the Institutio, when Quin-
tilian tries to refute the periaulum-topos by extending to
generals, magistrates, physicians, and philosophers the charge
that they sometimes endanger the state. The Gracchi, Satur-
ninus, and Glaucia, he says, were magistrates, as well as
orators (2.16. 4)
.
There was in fact a wealth of native material at hand for
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anyone, whether philosopher or political reactionary, who
wished to apply the periculum-topos to the history of Rome.
Moreover, the expulsion-topos had become a reality there as
well. In 161 B.C., alarmed by we do not know what threats
of Greek influence, the Senate passed a decree bidding the
praetor Pomponius see to it that there be no rhetors in Rome
f.f)\
{Romae ne essent)
.
Unfortunately for the philosophers, the
decree applied to them too, and whenever in later times it
was used to prove that rhetoric was not an art (because arts
are not expelled from cities) , the argument could be turned
against philosophy. Still further evidence of official hosti-
lity might have been seen in the edict of the censors, Cras-
sus and Ahenobarbus, in 9 2 B.C., against the Latin rhetors,
6
1
)
who were accused of maintaining a ludus impudentiae
.
To what
extent this edict may lurk behind later allusions to Roman
rejection of rhetoric is hard to determine, yet it too of-
fered only qualified support to the position of the philo-
sophical schools, since it was directed, not at all rhetori-
cal teaching, but only at the Latin rhetors. What is certain
is that the topos of danger to the orator found a predestined
home in Roman society.
The history of the Republic is littered with the corpses
of statesmen who, like all Romans engaged in political life,
had necessarily to engage in oratory as well and came to a
violent end, for which their eloquence could, in the context
of anti-rhetorical polemic, be made to seem responsible. In
de Oratore Cicero comments on the death of four of the speak-
ers in that dialogue, Antonius, Sulpicius, Catulus, and
Strabo, all of whom perished in the civil wars between Marius
and Sulla (3.3.9-11). In the Brutus the list of orators cru-
delissime interfecti is appalling. In de Republica Cicero names
many Romans who suffered from the fickleness of the people
(in addition to two of Plato's four, Miltiades and Themis-
tocles) , and he says that certain grateful admirers have
added his own name to the list of those exiled by the levitas
and cvudelitas of the people (1.3.5-6). It obviously gratified
Cicero to convert political disaster into a source of self-
esteem in this fashion, for he uses the same device in de
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Legibus, associating himself, by reason of his exile, with
the olarissimi viri ostracized by Athens, that ingrata civitas
(3.11.26). It is ironic that not exile but death catapulted
him into prominence in the periaulwri-topos , side by side with
Demosthenes, with whom he is paired in the famous passage in
Juvenal 10.118 (eloquio sed uterque perit orator) and in popular
philosophy and declamatio as well.
While Cicero clearly finds it necessary to refute the
charge that oratory endangers the state, a charge that he
counters both by praising the logos as the source of civili-
zation and by insisting that what he means by eloquence is
always united with sapientia, he appears to accept as one of
the unavoidable risks of public life the possibility of dan-
ger to the orator, and he never refers to the expulsion-topos
except in its milder form of listing states in which oratory
is unknown. This is the form in which Tacitus too employs
the topic.
Like Cicero in de Oratore, but unlike Philodemus, Quintilian,
and Sextus Empiricus, Tacitus in the Dialogue is concerned
with something more than simply rehearsing the charges leveled
against rhetoric and the refutations devised by the rhetors.
Both dialogues adapt the venerable topoi to complex literary
forms and purposes. In the case of Tacitus they are related
to his inquiry into the reasons for the decline of eloquence,
64)
a problem much discussed in the first century of our era.
Through Maternus, Tacitus suggests that the decline results
from Rome's changed political situation, but instead of de-
ploring the loss of liberty after the death of the Republic,
he praises the new regime in which decisions are made, not
by the imperiti et multi, but by the sapientissimus et unus (41.4) .
Under the conditions that now obtain, eloquence is as need-
less as inter sanos medians
.
Before arriving at this conclusion, Tacitus employs ele-
ments of the periculum-topos in both speeches assigned to Mater-
nus. The first recreates in the context of Roman society the
picture of the orator's life as one of constant harassment and
fatigue that we have met in Old Comedy, the Theaetetus , and
Philodemus, but substitutes poetry for philosophy as the
264 Illinois Classical Studies, VI .
2
preferred acrivity. Explaining why he has given up oratory
for poetry (as Tacitus himself at the time of writing was
giving up oratory for history) , Maternus expresses his deter-
-lination to detach himself a fcrensi l^dtcre and proclaims his
dislike for the hordes of szlul^atoves whom the orator must
endure each day. He so delights in woods, groves, and soli-
-ude zha- he co'-ir.rs it among the principal rewards of poetry
•rha- Lz IS ncr composed ->; szrsri—^ or with clients sitting on
one's doorstep or amid the ragged garments and lamentations
of the accused. Rather, the mind of the poet sesedit in looa
ruT'a, where rhe origins and innermost shrines of eloquence
are to be fo-ond (12.1-2). It soon develops that Maternus is
ccr.zraszing the satx^ix^ur. &~ ~x^^e~jr. Vivgilii secessun (13.1), not
jusz wizh the traditional picture of the life of the rhetor,
-ccally lacking in s:2hcle, but with the contemporary life of
zs.a ii'^z-zves , the notorious and powerful informers who prose-
cured men of wealth and position, sometimes with a view to
blackmail, sometimes in order to curry favor with the emperor.
Kinzerbct-om., in his analysis of the oratorical style
asscciared with deZ^itio, suggests that Quintilian's insistence
on -he moral function of the orator - v-Jr '::cr:j^ dicertdi perivus -
originated in his revulsion from the vicious conduct of the
gred.z de'^a-cres, one of whom, M. Aquillius Regulus , was actually
called a vn-r nalus dise'-'.di '>:v eiK-lrxs
.
Beyond any doubt, the
zer-^sulu- /iKuzilis-v::rpcs found its most apt illustration in the
delzz-zr-es
.
Tacitus in the Anriales (1.74) says of Suillius
Hufus thaz rhose who followed his example created periaulum
aliirS as zza^r-€r:^r. siii. Of the whole group Quintilian says
that they converted the power of speech ad >orrln-^ir. pemiaiem
(2.20.2). ^'c wonder then that Maternus, as he abandons ora-
-cry, arracks irs ccntem.pcrary mode as Vucrosa and sanguinans
and says that it is born &r ^.alis morib-xs (12.2). By contrast,
rhe Golden Age was lacking in orators and accusations, but
rich in poets (12.3). Here Tacitus adapts a philosophical
commonplace going back to Aristotle, who in the Protrepticus
commented on the absence of the moral virtues both in the
life of the gods and in the Isles of the Blessed, where they
were obviouslv unnecessarv. Cicero in the Scrtensius had
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expanded the topos by adding eloquence to the list of virtues
for which there would have been no need in a sinless socie-
ty. Now Tacitus, going a step further, extends the feli-
city of the legendary bards who lived in the Golden Age to
their successors in historical times - Homer and the tragic
poets, Virgil, Ovid, Varius , all of whom equal or surpass
in fame the greatest orators. He contrasts with the peace-
ful, carefree life of the poets the oertamina &t pev-louZa
endured by Vibius Crispus and Eprius Marcellus, delatores
whom Aper in a preceding speech (8) had praised as famous,
rich and powerful.
Just as Aper plays the role assigned to Polus in the Gov-
gias, so Maternus now draws a Socratic contrast between two
ways of life, no longer those of the philosopher and the
rhetor, but those of the poet and the delator, picturing with
a wealth of detail the inquieta et anxia oratomm vita. The dela-
tores are both fearful and feared, subject to daily demands
and to the wrath of those they serve, unable to appear satis
servi to their masters or satis liheri to anyone else. In fact,
they are no more powerful than freedmen {liberti, 13.4). Here
is the Roman counterpart of Plato's equation of the rhetor
or tyrant with the slave, a theme from the Gorgias embedded
in an adaptation of the passage from the Theaetetus about the
absence of sahole in the life of the advocate. Although it
would be far-fetched to hear in Maternus ' s concluding prayer
(that when he dies the statue on his grave may be, not r.aesv^j^
et atrox, sed hitaris et aoronatus , 13.6) an echo of Socrates'
promise of eudaimonia both here and hereafter for those who
have chosen the life he recommends {Gor>g. 527C) , the import-
ance attached to the choice of lives and the warning that the
life chosen must not be that of the rhetor undoubtedly owe
much to the Platonic tradition.
The other branches of our topos (danger to the state, re-
phrased as the incompatibility of rhetoric with a well-
ordered society, and danger to the orator) appear in the
second speech of Maternus, the last in the Dialogus. Here
Tacitus pronounces final judgment on the causes of the decline
of eloquence. He connects great oratory with political
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turmoil, non-existent under the present regime, and (perhaps
not without irony) converts into a blessing the conditions
that have pacified eloquence itself, like everything else,
since the days of Augustus (38.2). It is here too that he
takes issue with Cicero's praise of oratory in Brutus 45 as
pads... comes otique soaia et iam bene aonstitutae aivitatis quasi alum-
na quaedam, maintaining, on the contrary, that notable elo-
quence is an alumna lioentiae . . . comes seditionum, which does not
occur in bene constitutis civitatibus (40.2) •
Immediately after this unfavorable assessment of the role
of oratory in the state, Tacitus introduces his variation on
the expulsion-topos, which represents Sparta and Crete, Mace-
don and Persia, not indeed as having expelled the orators,
but as lacking them because of their severissima disciplina et
severissimae leges. The existence of many orators in Rhodes
and Athens is explained by the political dominance of the
mob (the imperiti) . On the same terms it is easy to account
for the more vigorous oratory {valentiorem eloquentiam) that
existed in Republican Rome, when it was rent by civil war
and all kinds of dissension. Tacitus has already explained
that great subjects foster great oratory (37.4-5). It was
not the speeches prosecuting his guardians that brought Demos-
thenes his fame, nor did the defence of Quinctius and Archias
make Cicero great. Catilina et Mile et Verves et Antonius hanc illi
69
)
famam ciroumdederunt (37.6). ' Now Tacitus undercuts the ora-
tory of the Republic by comparing it to the weeds that spring
from an unploughed field. His conclusion is a sentence that
with characteristic brevity and balance combines the two
essential parts of the perioulum-topos - danger to the state,
danger to the orator - emphasizing each through the most
authoritative exemplum traditional in its category. Sed nee
tanti rei publicae Gracchorum eloquentia fuit, ut pateretur et leges,
nee bene famam eloquentiae Cicero tali exitu pensavit (But the elo-
quence of the Gracchi was not of such value to the state that
it could also endure their legislation, nor did Cicero, with
the death that he suffered, pay a fair price for the fame of
his oratory)
.
The perioulum-topos did not perish with Tacitus, nor indeed
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with the end of antiquity. It continued to be used in a
variety of ways, often routine and dully repetitive, but
sometimes adapted to changing conditions and artistic aims.
Renewed emphasis on the moral dangers incurred by the orator
himself is evident in Christian authors such as St. Augus-
tine, who adopted an essentially Platonic view of the immora-
lity of artifice and deception. The classical antecedents
of the topos became unmistakable when Renaissance humanism
made the original sources generally available, so that, for
example, the funeral eulogy of a Renaissance Pope could
praise him in terms derived from de Inventione for combining
wisdom with eloquence and thus avoiding the dangers implicit
in either quality by itself, or Erasmus, in his influential
schoolbook de Copia Verborim ac Rerum, could offer as a model of
induction combined with example the familiar warning about
the excessive price paid by Demosthenes and Cicero for their
oratorical triumphs. Of course, every period or country
in which political conditions have allowed oratory a share
in guiding the course of events has produced enemies of
rhetoric who fulminate against the art of making the worse
appear the better reason. In our own time the enormously
increased influence conferred by television on all the arts
of persuasion (commercial even more than political) has given
to the old problem entirely new dimensions. Yet the connois-
seur of eloquence, in a year of presidential campaigning,
must more than ever mourn the absence of orators , in whatever
context, who have any need to feign a lack of deinotes.
Swarthmore College
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teahne, and it soon became a commonplace. Cf. Sextus Empiricus, Against
the Rhetoricians 10, 43.
18) Tiepl liiUXflQ 6 5p6uOQ , 173A. We note the ironic echo of Achilles'
pursuit of Hector, II. 22,161,
19) Consult Ingemar During, Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical
Tradition (Goteborg, 1957) 300-301,
20) See Andre Boulanger, Aelius Aristides (Paris, 1923) 234.
21) Cicero, de Or. 1.43, 3.65-68, Quintilian 3.1.15, 12.2.23, Consult
George Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion in Greece (Princeton, 1963) 272-301
and Kroll, P. W, Supp, VII, 1080-1083,
22) See Douglas on Brutus 121 for the ancient sources, among whom
Plutarch, Dem. 5, attributes the story to Hermippus in the third century
B.C.
23) For a comprehensive list see Quintilian 2.17 and consult Cicero,
de Or. 1.90-91 on the reported view of the Academic Charmadas: nullam
artem dicendi esse.
24) On the financial rewards of teaching rhetoric or writing handbooks
see Plato, Phaedr. 266C and Ehet. ad Her. 1.1.1.
25) Crassus, 1.45-46, Antonius 1.83-93.
26) Cicero, de Inv. 1.2-3, de Or. 1.30-34 (both passages praise the
logos in the manner of Isocrates, Nic. 5-9, Antid. 253-257); Quintilian
2.16.7-10.
27) Consult George Kennedy, The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World
(Princeton, 1972) 53-54 on the embassy of 155 B.C.
28) Perhaps the Lupus, a fabula praetexta dealing with Romulus and
Remus.
29) Cf. also de Or. 1.34 and 3,76,
30) Sextus 20-21, Philodemus II 65 frg, ii Sudhaus, cf, I p, 14, frg.
V, 359 col, LXX,
31) Cicero, Brut. 50, Tacitus, Dial. 40,3, Velleius Paterculus 1.17-18.
32) Sextus 20; on Carneades see Kroll, P. W. Supp. VII, 1083ff, and
cf. Cicero, de Or. 1.45 for the views of his pupils.
33) Sextus 24-25; cf. Philodemus I. 16, frg. ix.
34) 2.16.4.
35) 456D-457C. Isocrates' use of the same illustration {Antid. 252)
may have reinforced the topos , but his terminology is not the same. He
refers to the killing, not the expulsion of the athletes.
36) Glenn R. Morrow, Plato's Cretan City (Princeton, 1960) 32-39.
See also George Huxley, "Crete in Aristotle's Politics," ORES 12 (1971)
505-515,
37) Cicero, Brut. 50, commenting on the absence of orators in Sparta,
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refers to Spartan brevitas , going back to Menelaus in It. 3.213-214.
38) See Pausanias 1.14.4 and Plutarch, Lye. 4 for the tradition about
Thaletas of Gortyn and his influence at Sparta in the seventh century.
39) Aphth. Lac. 226D, on the gevn^CXoCa (exile) of undesirables; Inst.
Lao. 239C, on Cephisophon. The reason for his expulsion (that the good
speaker, mythetes , should keep his speech equal to his subject-matter)
implies, however, that not all orators were expelled. Cf. Aphth. Lao.
208C.
40) II. 146, frg. iii; II. 147-148, frg. iv.
41) I. 16, frg. ix; I. 14, frg. v; cf. II. 65, frg. ii.
42) See, e.g., Gudeman on Dial. 40.2.
43) Thucydides 3.37.3.
44) Edmonds, Fragments of Attio Comedy , frg. 220.
45) On Plato's use of derogatory comparisons in his attacks on rhe-
toric, see North, art oi.t. , note 2 above.
46) See below, p. 264. Juvenal adapts the theme to the unprofitable
life of the impecunious lawyer and the boring life of the teacher of
deolamatio in Sat. 7.106-149, 150-177.
47) I. 223, frg. xlii a.
48) II. 157, frg. xvii.
49) II. 133, frg. iv. This may be, not an Epicurean commonplace, but
a reflection of the relations between Philodemus and his patron Piso.
50) II. 136, frg. vi.
51) II. 139-140, frg. xi.
52) II. 147-148, frg. iv.
53) II. 151-152, frg. viii.
54) II. 154, frg. xii.
55) V. 1125-1126. Lucretius' warning is not directed specifically at
rhetors, but applies to all who seek wealth and power. In its most general
application this theme appears as early as the Ion of Euripides 597
XuTcpA Y^P T^^ HpeCaaova.
56) Symp. 216A, Alo. I, 127E ff.
57) Frg. LVII. 1-11 ed. Chilton. See also Lucretius III. 995-1002 on
Sisyphus as a type of futile ambition for imperium inane.
58) OU uavriYUPLeLV bt , 120a Bailey.
59) For a slightly different list of slain orators see ad Her. 4.22.31
and consult Douglas on Brut. 224.
60) Suetonius, de Gram, et Ehet. 25.
61) On the affair of the Latin rhetors, consult Kennedy (above, note
27) 90-91.
62) See Seneca, de Remed. Fort. 12.44 and Ps-Quintilian, Deol. 268 on
the question whether an orator, a doctor, or a philosopher is aivitati
utilissimus.
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63) E.g., de Inv. 1.2-3, de Or. 1.30-34.
64) Consult Harry Caplan, Of Eloquence (Ithaca, N.Y. , 1970) 160-195.
65) Michael Winterbottom, "Quintilian and the Vir Bonus," JRS 54 (1964)
90-97, cites Pliny, Ep. IV. 7, 5, on Regulus.
66) Consult Gudeman and Michel ad Zoo. , and see Aristotle, Eth. Nio.
1178B 7-23 and Frg. 58 Rose, and Cicero, Hortensius , frg. 92 Ruch, from
Augustine, de Tr-Cn. 14.9.12: quod opus esset eloquentia , awn indicia
nulla fierent, out ipsis etiam virtutibus. For like sentiments see Dial.
41.3 on the aivitas in qua nemo peccavet, Quintilian 2.17.28 (if all
judges were philosophers, there would be no need for rhetoric) and
Antisthenes, Frg. 125 Mullach (If you intend a boy to live with gods,
teach him philosophy, if with men, rhetoric). It is, of course, the
ultimate admission of the imperfect nature of rhetoric to ally it exclu-
sively with the imperfect state of society.
67) Some of the parallels between the Dialogue and the Gorgias are
noted by Franz Egerman, Hermes 70 (1935) 424-430.
68) Consult R. Dienel, VJS 37 (1915) 239-271 for adaptations of Cicero
in the Dialogue; the influence of de Republica is traced by Erich Koes-
termann, Hermes 65 (1930) 396-421.
69) Cf. 36.1: magna eloquentia, siout flamma, materia alitur.
70) See de Doot. Christ. 4.5.7 on the obligations of Christian preach-
ers, as sapientiae filii et ministri. cf. John Milton, T.L. II. 113-114
on Belial's power to make the worse appear the better reason, and P.R.
IV. 353-364 (Christ's rejection of the oratory of Greece and Rome).
71) Consult John M. McManamon, S.J., "The Ideal Renaissance Pope:
Formal Oratory from the Papal Court," Archivum Historiae Pontificiae 14
(1976) 9-70 on the eulogy of Pius II by Domenico de' Domenichi in 1464.
For Erasmus, see de Copia II, de Imagine.
